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V

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LOIS CROWDER,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a
body politic,
Case No. 14405
Defendant and
Appellant,
and JOHN DOES I
through X,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injury caused by
an automobile accident in Salt Lake County.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that Plaintiff failed to file notice of claim
within 90 days as required by the Utah Governmental

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 (1967).

Plain-

tiff filed an Amended Complaint, admitted that notice
had not been timely filed, but alleged that the notice
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act are
unconstitutional as applied to counties.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and
filed a Memorandum Decision declaring that the 90 day
notice requirement violates equal protection of the
laws and is unconstitutional.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the trial court's

'

Order denying its Motion to Dismiss.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

<

Plaintiff was injured when the automobile she was
operating collided with a bridge abutment owned by
i

Salt Lake County.

The accident occurred October 28,

1974.
Plaintiff did not give written notice of her claim

|

to Salt Lake County until April 3, 1975, 65 days beyond
the 90 day notice period.

Subsequently, Plaintiff
I
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filed this action alleging that the county highway
was negligently designed and lacked proper signs#
markers, reflectors and lighting.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES ARE RATIONALLY RELATED
TO A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL OBJECTIVE.
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court have consistently held that legislation
may discriminate between classes of individuals if
the classification is reasonable and has some rational
relation to a legitimate legislative objective.

E.g.,

San Antonio Independent School v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 40 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76

(1971);

Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 7879 (1911); State v. Warwick, 11 Utah 2d 116, 355 P.2d
703 (1960); Wein v. Crockett, 115 Utah 301, 195 P.2d
222 (1948).
In recent years the courts have applied a twotiered approach to analysis of equal protection claims.
If the classification is based on a "suspect criterion",
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or affects a "fundamental interest", the statute will
be scrutinized closely and will not be upheld unless
necessary for a "compelling state interest".
Suspect criteria include race, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); and national origin,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
Fundamental rights include the right to vote,
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S.
621, 626-27 (1969), the right to travel,Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969), the right to
procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942), and the right to marry, Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
Conversely, if the classification is not "suspect" and the right affected is not "fundamental",
all doubts will be resolved in favor of the legislation and it will be upheld unless the classification
is wholly irrelevent to the purpose of the statute.
As the United States Supreme Court held in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961);
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Although no precise formula has been
developed, the Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a
wide scope of discretion in enacting laws
which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant
to the achievement of the State's objective.
State legislatures are presumed to have
acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their
laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it. (emphasis added)

The Court should, therefore, look to the purposes
of the notice statute.

If any set of facts can be

conceived which would justify a discrimination between
different governmental entities, the statute should
be upheId.
Generally, the notice provisions require that a
claim be filed within a specified time.

The time is

one year for the state , and 90 days for other governmental

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12: A claim against the state or
any agency thereof as defined herein shall be forever
barred unless notice thereof is filed with the attorney
general of the state of Utah and the agency concerned
within one year after the cause of action arises.
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entities , except that suits against a city for a
defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any
3
highway, road, etc., can be filed within six months .
After the claim is filed the entity has 90 days
to allow or reject the claim.

If the claim is re-

jected or the 90 day period expires, the individual
may then bring suit within one year after the rejection or the end of the 90 day period.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13: A claim against a political subdivision shall be forever barred unless
notice thereof is filed within ninety days after
the cause of action arises; . . -

Utah Code Ann. §10-7-77: Every claim against a city
or incorporated town for damages or injury, alleged
to have been caused by the defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition of any street, alley,
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge of such city
or town, or from the negligence of the city or town
authorities in respect to any such street, alley,
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert or bridge, shall within
six months after the happening of such injury or
damage be presented to the board of commissioners
or city council of such city, or board of trustees
of such town, . . .
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There are numerous purposes for notice statutes.
Among them are the following:
1.

A requirement of notice provides the

governmental entity with the opportunity to settle meritorious claims before suit is instituted,
thus avoiding needless litigation and legal expense.
2.

A requirement of notice provides the

governmental entity with an opportunity to investigate claims while the evidence is still fresh and
thereby to avoid stale and fraudulent claims.
3.

A requirement of notice allows the gov-

ernmental entity to make prompt repairs of dangerous defects, thereby avoiding other injuries and
resultant suits.
4.

A requirement of notice facilitates

budgeting and tax planning*
5.

Notice requirements generally facilitate

the orderly and expeditious administration of
public business.
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Some of these purposes were discussed by this
Court in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27,
492 P.2d 1335 (1972), where the Court pointed out the
problems in not requiring notice:

The unsatisfactory aspects of such a situation:
Deprivation of the city of an opportunity to make
a prompt investigation of the particular case,
and if any defect is found to exist to remedy it;
the possibility that changes may have occurred
in the material circumstances; and the carry-over
to subsequent city administrations of responsibility for accidents that may have previously occurred,
are sufficiently obvious not to require further
elaboration.

492 P.2d at 1335.
The need for each of these objectives may vary
between governmental entities.

Some of the differences

between these entities may be classified as follows:
A.

Geographical and Population Differences

The state's responsibility extends over a large
geographical area and its affairs are administered
through numerous rather complex agencies, involving
thousands of employees.

Although a rural county may

extend over a large area, it may have a smaller population and fewer employees involved in the administration
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of governmental affairs. A county, therefore, may
reasonably require a shorter notice period since
there may be no other way for the county personnel
to promptly discover and correct defective conditions.
Although a city is geographically more compact
than a county, it may have more miles of roadway to
maintain, a more extensive water and sewer service,
expanded welfare and health services, more numerous
schools, e t c , and, therefore, require more complex
agencies to administer its duties to a larger population, than a large sparsely populated county whose
governmental functions are less complex, in which case
a shorter notice period would be reasonable.
B.

Differences in Services

The services performed by different governmental
entities vary greatly in nature and complexity.

The

state performs such services as employment security,
industrial regulation, higher education, insurance
regulation, National Guard, liquor control, Highway
Patrol, fish and game regulation, and a host of other
services not provided by any other governmental entity.
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Because of the complexity of the state government
a citizen may reasonably require a longer period
to formulate and present a claim.

A citizen of a

small city can easily present a claim to the city
when it has only a few employees and the city hall
is in close proximaty to the citizen's home; conversely, if the citizen is injured by an agency of
the state he may reasonably require a somewhat longer
period to identify the involved agency and to present and process his grievance.

Practical experience

demonstrates that it necessarily requires considerably
longer for the citizen to attempt an administrative
solution to his problem where the state bureaucracy
is involved than where a local governmental entity is
concerned.

The legislature undoubtedly took into

account the fact that distances usually involved in
dealing with the state governmental agencies generally
prevent the personal and more expeditious handling of
citizens' grievances.
C.
The

Differences in Budgeting and Revenues
budgeting problems of the state, the various
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counties, and the cities and towns are wholly differThe statefs broad tax base and annual budget

ent.

sessions permit financial projections on an annual
basis.

Cities and counties have considerably more

restricted sources of revenue and so their problems
in projecting budgetary needs are different.

The im-

pact of a large claim or judgment upon the state as
compared to a school district, a small city or rural
county is different.

The variation in notice require-

ments materially assists the various governmental entities to take into account the potential financial
requirements to satisfy claims which have been timely
filed.
D.

Differences in Manpower

The state with its large manpower force is in a
position to more easily avoid fraudulent claims through
thorough investigation of claims than can the small
city.

The shorter claim period applicable to a city

or county with more limited facilities is entirely appropriate and necessary to permit an earlier identification of the claims and investigation, which can be
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done more economically and effectively than after a
lapse of a longer period.
Similarly, the cost and impact of litigation
is more significant to the school district or a small
city which has no staff attorney, or the rural county
where no attorney resides, than would the same litigation to the state

which maintains the largest

single staff of attorneys in Utah.
Although it would be impossible for the legislature to take into account every possible variation or
difference between the numerous governmental entities
within the state, those noted demonstrate the reasonableness of providing different notice periods for the
general categories of governmental entities.
In fact, the legislature would have been justified in establishing further refinements in notice requirements as between different cities based on population, geographical area, and so forth.

That the legis-

lature did not choose to do so was its prerogative.
The classification relating to the various notice requirements rests upon relevant considerations to achieve
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legitimate state purposes.

The United States Supreme

Court stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 489 (1955):

The problem of legislative classification
is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire
definition. Evils in the same field may be of
different dimensions and proportions, requiring
different remedies. Or so the legislature may
think . . . Or the reform may take one step at
a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. . . The legislature may select one
phase of one field and apply a remedy there,
neglecting the others . . . The prohibition of
the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than
the invidious discrimination.
(citations omitted)

POINT II.

THE LEGISLATURE MAY IMPOSE REASONABLE
RESTRICTIONS IN WAIVING GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity predates the
founding of the State of Utah, and the founding of
the United States.

See e.g., Black v. Rempublicam,

1 Yeates 140 (Pa. 1792).
This doctrine is part of the common law and has
been consistently followed by this Court.

Holt v.

Utah State Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d
1286 (1973); Hampton v. State, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d
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I

708 (1968) ; Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10
Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960); jopes v. Salt
Lake County, 9 Utah 2d 297, 343 P.2d 728 (1959);
State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 21, 286 P.2d 785
(1955); Hojorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241
P.2d 907 (1952); Bingham v.

Board of Education,

118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 (1950); Campbell Building
Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d
857 (1937); State Road Commission v. Fourth District
Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937); Wilkinson
v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913).
Although frequently called upon to do so, the
Court forbore altering this doctrine because to do
so is a legislative matter.

As the Court held in

Hojorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907,
909 (1953) :

This phase of our
and of long standing.
that must come through
this commonwealth, the
the Legislature.

law is well established
If it is to be changed,
the sovereign power of
people, speaking through

In 1965 the legislature responded by enacting
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the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-1, et seq. (1967).
This Act waives governmental immunity, subject
to limitations in amount, §63-30-34; reservations
as to types of actions, §§63-30-5 to 10; the procedural requirements of notice, §§63-30-11 to 15, and
the filing of an undertaking, §63-30-19.
The plaintiff now wishes to take advantage of
the waiver of immunity as provided in the Act, without complying with the procedural requirements of the
Act.

It is fair to assume that the legislature did

not intend one to be operative without the other.
This Court, in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d
27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972), acknowledged the application
of this concept in the following language:

The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity which
would ordinarily protect the City from such
a suit was part of the common law and thus
part of the body of law which was assimilated
into the law of this jurisdiction at statehood.
The allowance of a claim against the city for
injuries which may be suffered because of the
". . -defective, unsafe, dangerous . . . condition of any street . . ." is a statutorily
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created exception to the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity. Inasmuch as the maintenance of such
a cause of action derives from such statutory
authority, a prerequisite thereto is meeting
the conditions prescribed in the statute. A
party seeking to obtain the benefit thereof
should not be entitled to claim the favorable
aspects which confer the rights, and disavow
the conditions upon which the rights are predicated . (emphasis added)

27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335, 1337-38 (1972). See
also, Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104
N.E.2d 866 (1952); Brantley v. Dallas, 498 S.W.2d
452 (Tex. Cir. App. 1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974).

POINT III.

DIFFERING NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
HAVE BEEN DECLARED CONSTITUTIONAL .

Defendant has been unable to find any reported
case in which notice requirements were found unconstitutional because they differed as between governmental
entities.
The only case which has ever treated the exact
issue raised here is Bleamaster v. County of Los Angeles,
11 Cal. Rptr. 214 (Cal. App. 1961).

There the Court held:
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The distinction between a county and a city
is a sufficient basis for a distinction in
classification for the purpose of establishing a procedure for the enforcement of the
right of a property owner to recover compensation for the taking or damaging of property
for public use. Sections 29702 and 29704 of
the Government Code apply equally to all persons who have claims against a county, and
said sections apply equally to all counties.
The sections are not within the prohibitions
of the state Constitution or the federal Constitution upon the asserted basis that they
apply only to claims against counties or upon
the asserted basis that they do not apply to
similar claims against cities.

In other contexts most states have held that distinctions between cities and counties, as well as distinctions between governmental entities based on population are reasonable.

E.g.,

Lockwood v. State,

462 S.W.2d 465 (Ark. 1971); People v. Public Building
Comm'n., 238 N.E.2d 390 (111. 1968); Dortch v. Luger,
266 N.E.2d 25 (Ind. 1971); Pinchback v. Stephens, 484
S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1972).
It is true that three state courts, Michigan,
Nevada, and Washington, have overturned notice statutes,but
on an entirely different basis:

that any discrimination

between individuals injured by governmental tort-feasors
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and those injured by private tort-feasors is constitutionally impermissible.

Reich v. State Highway

Dept., 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Turner
v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879 (Nev. 1973); Hunter v. North
Mason High School, 539 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1975).
These three cases, however, share a common error.
Each assumes that the purpose of their respective
legislative schemes is to put governments on an equal
footing with private tort-feasors.

For example in

Hunter the Washington Court said:

The state's waiver of tort immunity is
unbridled by procedural conditions pertaining
to the consent to be sued.

539 P.2d at 850.
And in Turner, the Nevada Court said:

The stated object of NRS 41.031 is to
waive the immunity of governmental units and
agencies from liability for injuries caused
by their negligent conduct, thus putting them
on an equal footing with private tort-feasors.

510 P.2d at 882

in Reich, the Michigan court said:
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[Cjontrary to the legislature's intention to
place victims of negligent conduct on an equal
footing, the notice requirement . . . bars the
actions of victims of governmental negligence
after only 60 days.

194 N.W.2d at 702.
The error of this analysis is obvious:

_I_f the

legislature had intended to place governmental tortfeasors and private tort-feasors on an exactly equal
basis, they would not have adopted the notice requirement in the first place.
The Idaho Supreme Court very recently considered
this problem in Newlan v. State, 535 P.2d 1348 (Ida.
1975) and held:

We find the opinion in Reich to be highly
conclusory without any consideration of the
rationale for such notice statute, nor any real
analysis of the equal protection problem. We
are not persuaded by that authority.
We find Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879
(Nev. 1973) to be equally unpersuasive. . .
We believe the opinions of the Michigan
and Nevada courts are contrary to the weight of
authority. Most states have consistently rejected similar constitutional attacks.

535 P.2d at 1352.
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Other cases upholding notice requirements are
Artukovich v. Astendorf, 131 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1942);
and Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1973).
It should also be noted that if the analysis
of the Reich, Hunter and Turner cases is adopted,
then any discrimination between governmental and
private tort-feasors is impermissible and the entire
Governmental Immunity Act is invalid; the Court
would have to overrule a long line of cases upholding governmental immunity; even a different statute
of limitations or venue provision would be unconstitutional.
As this Court held in Wilcox v. Salt Lake City,
26 Utah 2d 78, 484 P.2d 1200 (1971):

[p]laintiffs . . . seem to say that . . .
we should judicially abolish the doctrine
altogether as being archaic and doing so
judicially to legislate our Governmental
Immunity Act out of existence. This last
contention we are not inclined to espouse,
in spite of a claimed trend in that direction, noted by plaintiffs' adversions to
scholarly papers written by eminent educators,
and the judicial pronouncements of some sister
states.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT IV.

THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY UPHELD
THE APPLICABILITY OF EACH OF THE
NOTICE PROVISIONS.

The Constitutionality of the notice provisions
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act has been assumed by this Court as each of the provisions has
been applied without question.
In Scarsborough v. Granite School District,
531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975), the 90 day requirement was
upheld as to school districts; in Varoz v. Sevey,
29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973), the 90 day requirement was applied to a county.
In Roosendall Const. & Mining Corp. v. Holman,
28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972), the one-year
notice provision was applied.
in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27,
492 P.2d 1335 (1972), the 30 day notice provision
was upheld against a challenge on equal protection
grounds.

Section 10-7-77 has since been amended so

as to make the filing time six months rather than
30 days.
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These statutes were explained and clarified in
Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah
1975).
POINT V.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS
OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE LEGISLATURE .

The trial judge's Memorandum Decision, without
citation of a single authority, held that:

The differences between state, counties
and cities are not, in my opinion, such as to
require different periods for filing notice
of claim. Their respective needs for investigating such claims and correcting defects do
not differ.

Unfortunately, the trial judge's Opinion does
not provide guidance as to which one, if any, of the
time periods does apply.

Rather, the judge says:

It is not for this Court to fix a time
period within which such claims must be filed,
as such is for legislative determination.

If only the difference in time periods is unconstitutional, why should the 90 day provision be
struck down?

If all governmental entities must use
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the same notice period, how can this Court determine whether the period should be 90 days, six
months, or one year?
It is respectfully suggested that only the
legislature, who studied this problem carefully,
is in a position to determine which time period
applies, and they have already spoken in enacting the
three separate periods.

It should be noted that the

trial court found the notice provisions unconstitutional without relying on any evidence or any case
dealing directly with the subject.

The trial court's

ruling is one opinion to be weighed against that of
the entire legislature of this state.
The Indiana Supreme Court said, in sustaining
legislation that distinguished between cities and
towns:

Legitimate reasons for a different treatment between cities and towns can often arise
and it is not the function of this Court to
ferret out the motive of the legislature in
passing this legislation.

Crider v. State, 282 N.E.2d 819, 823(ind. 1972).
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CONCLUSION
In waiving governmental immunity the legislature had the right to impose reasonable limitations
and procedural restrictions.

After careful study

the legislature determined that three separate notice
provisions should be used for different governmental
entities.

It is not the function of this Court to

second-guess the legislature or to substitute its own
judgment for that of the legislature.

Rather this

Court should enforce the legislation unless distinctions made are wholly irrelevent to the object of the
legislation.
There are good and valid reasons why different
governmental entities require a different time for
notice.

Consequently, the legislation should be upheld.

Respectfully submitted,
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